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JAG JUSTICE TODAY
by
CARL B. KLEIN*
In The Catholic University of America Law Review issue of January
1956, there appeared an article by Arthur John Keeffe,' entitled JAG
Justice in Korea.2 Within the space allowed for this reply it will not be
possible to discuss everything said by Professor Keeffe in his article. This
reply will therefore be limited to a discussion of some of the more contro-
versial things that still remain and have present meaning. The purpose
of the discussion is to refresh and widen the understanding of those things.
Essentially then, the matters that will be discussed are the following:
1. The background materials of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
2. The permanent paid part-time civilian advisory council concept.
3. The matter of military justice in Korea during the war.
4. The abolishing of the staff legal officer's review and the boards of
review and substituting direct appeal to the Court of Military
Appeals.
5. The top clemency board concept.
6. The matter of command control of courts-martial.
*Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve. On active duty, Military Justice Division, Office
of the Judge Advocate General, Navy, Washington, D. C. Member of the Bar of the State
of Illinois, the United States Court of Military Appeals and the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The opinions and conclusions expressed in this reply are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent the views of either the Judge Advocate General or the Department
of the Navy as a whole.
I am indebted to Capt. Edmund Burke, Jr., USN, for suggestions on the historical
background of the UCMJ and to Maj. Cecil L. Cutler, Jr., USA, for information on com-
mand control versus command responsibility.
I Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America School of Law.
2 Keeffe, JAG Justice in Korea, 6 CATHOLIC U. OF AMER. L. REv. 1 (1956).
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
7. The bad conduct discharge.
8. The delinquency and educational problem in the military.
9. The one-man law officer court-martial approach.
10. The foundation of the military system of discipline.'
-1-
No real understanding of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is
possible without at least some acquaintance with the background ma-
terials out of which it was fashioned by the Congress. Now, with this in
mind, plans for a change in the structure of the permanent Military
Establishment were being formulated at about the time the demobilization
of World War II forces reached completion. Secretary of War Patterson
met with Mr. Willis Smith, President of the American Bar Association,
and requested that members of the Association be selected to servc on
the War Department Advisory Committee. This Committee was created
on March 25, 1946, and consisted of nine outstanding lawyers and Federal
jurists from eight states and the District of Columbia. The Honorable
Arthur T. Vanderbilt was appointed chairman.! The report of this Com-
mittee was submitted on December 13, 1946 after months of study and
research.' At about the same time the Committee on Military Affairs
of the House of Representatives, 79th Congress, also made a report on
the judicial system of the Army.'
In accordance with these studies identical bills for revising the Army
court-martial system were separately introduced into the United States
Senate and the House of Representatives.! After lengthy hearings the
House of Representatives passed H.R. 2575. No hearings were held by the
Senate on the companion bill. However, toward the end of the 80th
3 The numbering is keyed to the individual sections of the discussion.
4 The other recognized leaders of the legal profession who served on this Committee
were the Honorable Alexander Holtzoff, Walter P. Armstrong, Joseph W. Henderson,
William T. Joyner, the Honorable Frederick E. Crane, Jacob M. Lashly, the Honorable
Morris A. Loper and Floyd E. Thompson. Royall, Revision of the Military Justice Process,
33 VA. L. REV. 269 (1947).
5 REPORT OF WAR DEP'T ADVISORY COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE TO THE
SEC'Y OF WAR (1946).
6H.R. REP. No. 2722, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
7S. 903, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) and H.R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),
respectively.
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Congress, the bill as passed by the House, and known as the Elston Act,
was included as an amendment to the Selective Service Act of 1948
during Senate debate, and later became Public Law 759, 80th Congress.'
During this time a very similar development had been taking place
relative to the Navy court-martial system. At the request of the Secretary
of the Navy, a Committee headed by the Honorable Arthur A. Ballantine,
New York attorney and former Under Secretary of the Treasury,' sub-
mitted its first report in 1943, followed by a second report in 1946.10
Another committee, reporting in 1945, recommended a complete revision
of the Articles for the Government of the Navy. This committee was
headed by the Honorable Matthew F. McGuire, United States District
Court Judge, District of Columbia.1 The Reverend Robert J. White,"2
then Dean of the Catholic University School of Law, also made recom-
mendations for changes in the Navy court-martial system as a result of
several studies undertaken by him.'" Another comprehensive report recom-
mending numerous changes in the naval system was submitted by the
General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board headed by Professor Keeffe,
with Mr. Felix E. Larkin as Vice-President." Based upon the foregoing
reports and independent studies within the Department of the Navy, a
proposed bill for the amendment and revision of the Articles for the
Government of the Navy was introduced in Congress. "
It was during the 80th Congress that the National Security Act of
194716 was enacted, unifying the armed services and creating a separate
Department of the Air Force effective September 18, 1947. Since there
were such wide differences between the proposed Army and Navy systems
8 62 STAT. 627, Act of June 24, 1948. 62 STAT., Ch. 625, Sec. 201, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1948), 10 U.S.C. 1472 et seq.; U.S. Cong. Ser., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), Leg.
Hist. 2225.
9 The membership of the Ballantine Committee included, among others, Professor Noel
T. Dowling, Columbia University Law School; the Honorable Matthew F. McGuire, United
States District Court Judge; Major General Thomas E. Watson, U.S. Marine Corps; and
Rear Admiral George L. Russell, U.S. Navy, then Assistant Judge Advocate General of
the Navy.
10REPORT OF BALLANTINE COMM. TO SEC'Y OF THE NAVY (1943); RE-
PORT OF BALLANTINE COMM. TO SEC'Y OF THE NAVY (1946).
11 Other committee members were the Honorable Alexander Holtzoff, United States
District Court Judge, and Colonel James M. Snedeker, U.S. Marine Corps. REPORT OF
MCGUIRE COMM. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY (1945).
12 Rear Admiral, U.S. Naval Reserve (Ret'd).
13WHITE, A STUDY OF 500 NAVAL PRISONERS AND NAVAL JUSTICE (1947).
1" REPORT OF THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD
TO THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY (1947).
15 S. 1338 (starred version), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) and H.R. 3687, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947).
16Act of July 26, 1947 (61 STAT. 495, c. 343).
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and in order to avoid the establishment of a third system, Secretary of
Defense James Forrestal in July 1948 appointed a special committee to
draft a uniform code of military justice which would apply equally to
all of the Services. Professor Edmund Morgan, Jr., of the Harvard Uni-
versity Law School, was designated chairman, the other members of the
committee being: Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, Under
Secretary of the Navy John Kenny, and Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force Eugene Zukert. Supplementing the efforts of the main committee
was a working group of approximately fifteen persons, including officer
representatives of each of the Services and five civilian lawyers under the
chairmanship of Mr. Felix Larkin, who was now Assistant General Counsel
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After seven months of study
the combined efforts of this committee resulted in S. 857, presented to
the Senate, and a companion bill, H.R. 4080, presented to the House of
Representatives." These bills subsequently resolved themselves into what
is known today as the "Uniform Code of Military Justice."18
Thus, as may be seen, the Code did not come about as the result of
any hurried rendezvous with time. Almost three years from the appoint-
ment of the Vanderbilt Committee in March 1946 had been spent in
gathering and collating advice and information. The latter represented
all points of view from the ultra-conservative to ultra-liberal as revealed
in the expressions of judges, attorneys, teachers, prison officials, chaplains,
sociologists, psychiatrists, other civilians, members of the military, bar
associations and veterans' organizations. In addition, during the actual
hearings on the Code, the Congress heard some thirty-odd witnesses
and called for all sorts of special information. It was out of this plenitude
of advice and information that the Code was ultimately fashioned."
17 U.S. Cong. Ser., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), Leg. Hist. 2225.
18 Act of May 5, 1950, 64 STAT. 108 (50 U.S.C. 551-736). Codified and enacted
into law as Title 10 of the United States Code, entitled "Armed Forces." Act of August 10,
1956, (Public Law 1028, c. 1041, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 70A Stat. 36). NOTE: Correspond-
ing sections of Title 10 may be found by adding 800 to the specific Article of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. (Hereafter referred to as the "Code" and in subsequent footnotes
as the "UCMJ").
1095 Cong. Rec. (pt. 5) 5718-30 (1949) (extended remarks).
Of course the UCMJ is not a perfect code. There are perhaps in all history only three
codes which were perfect in the sense that they met the test of time. One of these is the
Code of Hammurabi, instituted by Hammurabi, king of Babylon about 1955-1913 B.C.
This code has 282 clauses and shows a certain systematic order. It begins with accusation
of murder and sorcery, and passes through all grades of social and domestic life, ending
with a scale of wages for all classes of workmen. W. A. Bewes has suggested that much
of our modern commercial law is ultimately traceable to this code. BEWEs, THE ROMANCE
OF THE LAW MERCHANT (1923). The Code of Hammurabi remained the basis of the
legal system of the Babylonian area for nearly 1500 years after Hammurabi's death.
60
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One of the points made by Professor Keeffe in his article is that the
Congress should create a permanent paid part-time civilian advisory
council. The purpose of this council would be to recommend to the
Secretaries of the armed services and to the Congress changes in the
court-martial system from time to time, based on the council's observation
of the practicability and workability of the court-martial system in opera-
tion and based on its appraisal of current trends in civilian criminology."
The principal advocate for the creation of advisory bodies to aid
civil courts was the late Mr. Justice Benjamin L. Cardozo. He proposed
their creation in a celebrated Harvard Law Review article appearing in
1921.21 However, in the 38 years since the proposal was made, it has not
met with general acceptance in the states albeit the eminence of its
sponsorship.2 It is true that in the interim a majority of the states have
established such organizations or some equivalent, such as a judicial con-
ference. But the notion of a paid, part-time or full-time permanent body
Another is the Corpus Juris Civilis or Justinian Code. Immediately after acceding to
the throne in 518, Justinian I appointed a commission to go through the whole pre-existing
body of law and customs of the various provinces of the Roman empire, to select such laws
and customs of the various provinces as were of practical value, to cut these down by
retrenching all unnecessary matter, getting rid of any contradictions by omitting one or
other of the conflicting passages, and to consolidate the balance into a uniform code. The
Corpus Juris of Justinian continued to be the chief law-book of the Roman world till a
new system was prepared in the 9th century by Leo the Isaurian and called the Basilica,
The third is the Code Napoldon. This code was undertaken under the consulship of
Napoleon I by the most eminent jurists of France, and was published in 1804. The code
was the product of Roman and customary law, together with the ordinances of the kings
and the laws of the Revolution. Although political upheavals have caused some changes
and modifications, the Code Napolgon has remained virtually the same as when it left the
hands of its framers. The extent of its influence upon the laws of other countries has been
very great, as it formed the basis of the codes, among others, of the two Sicilies (1819),
the Netherlands in 1837, the Swiss cantons from 1819 to 1855, Bolivia in 1843 and the
Civil Code of the State of Louisiana.
Even though the UCMJ is not a perfect code, it does constitute a great departure from
the former system followed in the military. However, an appreciation of the full extent of
this departure is something which can only come in time. Time is required not only for
the primary task of analyzing the UCMJ, but more important for adequate reflection upon
its potential. Reflection is a slow process. "Wisdom, like good wine, requires maturing".
(The quotation is from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reservation in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351
U.S. 470, 485).
2-1 Keeffe, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 2.
The Vanderbilt Committee made a similar recommendation respecting the Army court-
martial system. REPORT OF WAR DEP'T ADVISORY COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE
TO THE SEC'Y OF WAR (1946).
Cardozo, A Alinistry ol Jus:ice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921).
VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 87 (1949).
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has yet to receive wide acceptance in the states.2" One of the objections
to establishing such bodies with authority suited to what is required to
be done seems to have been the fear that in time they might threaten the
independence of the judiciary. For this reason those bodies which were
actually set up have been kept mostly advisory, with their duties limited
to investigating complaints, preparing reports, statistics and bills, and
doing special studies. 4 Furthermore, the failure here of certain states to
accept this concept at all-and of others to implement it with vigor"-
would in some measure appear to support this conclusion. It would seem
that the ideal of this concept has through the years primarily remained
a matter of real interest only to scholars in the law and sociology, and
to the learned generally.
Elsewhere, in certain civil law countries, the centralized body charged
with the responsibility of law reform is the Ministry of Justice. These
bureaus make a continuous study of the organization, rules, and methods
of procedure and practice of the judicial system of the country, the work
accomplished, and the results produced by that system and its various
parts. " These powers are not too much unlike those that frame the
authority of the judicial councils as have been established in the states.
In this connection there have from time to time been some indications
in the public media that such powers make it possible for these bureaus to
reach down and into the business of a presumably independent judicial
system. This is precisely the kind of force that has always been foreign
to the American idea of an independent judiciary.
Americans, it would seem, would prefer their justice a little less
perfect in procedural matters so long as it is just and free and unrestricted
otherwise.
The proposal for establishing a civilian advisory council within the
scheme of military justice was submitted to the Congress at the time
of the hearings on the Code. The proposal was contained in a statement
submitted by Professor Keeffe to the House Armed Services Committee
in lieu of testifying. In his statement Professor Keeffe made a strong
and eloquent argument in favor of such a council. The statement itself
was based upon the report brought forth by his General Court-Martial
23 IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Am. Bar Ass'n Handbook
(1952), pp. 37-39.
24 Id., at 41-45.
25 E.g., the organizations already established are by and large ex officio committees. Id.
26 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Institute of Judicial Administration (2 U-68), June 25,
1954, p. 1. This sheet contains an excellent bibliography on advisory councils.
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Sentence Review Board in which this proposal of his had first been made."'
Of no little interest here is the fact that the report of the General Court-
Martial Sentence Review Board was available to the working group under
Professor Morgan of which Mr. Felix Larkin was chairman. As already
mentioned the latter had been Vice-President of this board under Professor
Keeffe. As one of the signers of the board's report, Mr. Larkin was un-
doubtedly familiar with its contents including the recommendation for
establishing a civilian advisory council. 8 Although Mr. Larkin did most
of the testifying on the Code before the House Armed Services Committee,
the Code as drafted by the committee and adopted by the House made no
provision for an advisory council.
The Code next came before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Following the usual hearings, the committee left the Code in approxi-
mately the same form in which it was passed by the House. However,
when the Code reached the Senate floor Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon
moved for its amendment. In the course of the ensuing debate Senator
Morse invited the Senate's attention to an article written by Professor
Keeffe and Mr. Morton Moskin which appeared in the Cornell Law
Quarterly in the fall of 1949 under the title Codified Military Injustice.
At Senator Morse's request the article was ordered printed verbatim in
the congressional record.29 The article, covering some 20 pages, contained
a detailed discussion of the things which the authors found objectionable
in the Code as passed by the House. They concluded:
"The only hope for improvement is to condition passage of the Code upon
the appointment of an advisory council-and this is what was suggested by
the Navy's General Court Martial Sentence Review Board in 1947.
"Such a body can be relied upon to follow this court-martial reform to the
bitter end."2 0
Still, the Code, as passed by the Senate, made no provision for establish-
ing an advisory council within the scheme of military justice.
Professor Keeffe says that the hearings should have been conducted
by the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate since their member-
ship is limited to lawyers only. 1 The rosters of the Armed Services Coin-
27, Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed
Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 837-8 (1949).
2- Pasley and Larkin, The Navy Court Martial: Proposals for its Reform, 33 CORNELL
L. Q. 195, 233 (1947).
29 96 Cong. Rec. (pt. 2) 1434 (1950).
30 Keeffe and Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 CORNELL L. Q. 151, 170 (1949).
31 Keeffe, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 1, 38.
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mittees at the time of the hearings show that about half of the members
had legal training. Within this context there should be no need for
committees to be composed entirely of lawyers in order for them to
judge the value of a civilian advisory council in matters of military justice
inasmuch as committees are ruled by majority vote. Moreover, during the
floor debate in the Senate, a motion was made by the late Senator Mc-
Carran, then chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to refer the Code to
that committee. On vote, the motion was rejected 43 to 33." So that
much of what is said by Professor Keeffe on the matter of an advisory
council for the Services has already been considered and rejected by both
sides of the Congress.
In lieu of a civilian advisory council the Congress provided for the
Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates General to meet
annually to make a comprehensive survey of the operation of the Code
and report to the Congress the number and status of pending cases and
any recommendations relating to uniformity of sentence policies, amend-
ments to the Code, and any other matters deemed appropriate." It has
been generally conceded that the provision for a civilian Court of Military
Appeals constituted the most revolutionary new concept introduced to the
scheme of military justice. It was therefore in keeping with this new
concept for the Congress to cloak the Court with powers sufficient to
appoint committees as required to make recommendations regarding any
of these matters. In the past the Court has appointed such a committee-
the Seymour Committee-to make recommendations respecting the
Code.34 The accounts available at the time indicated that this committee
discharged its responsibility in a commendable manner. That such a com-
mittee was appointed is in itself evidence of the fact that these powers are
not wanting in potential. Furthermore, there is the ever continuing
interest in and awareness of the conduct of the military establishment
maintained by the members of the Congress, particularly on the part of
the Armed Services Committees, which should not be discounted here.
For the Congress, in the exercise of its inherent power, may set up an
ad hoc or select committee at any time to inquire into the desirability of
change in the Code.
3296 Cong. Rec. (pt. 2) 1417 (1950).
33 UCMJ, Art. 67 (g).
34 The members of this Court Committee were Whitney North Seymour (Chairman),
Ralph B. Boyd, Henry T. Dorrance, Felix E. Larkin, Joseph A. McClain, Jr., George A.
Spiegelberg, Arthur E. Sutherland and Donald L. Deming. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATES
GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 24 (1953).
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As a result of the rich experience harvested by the Court in develop-
ing military law under the Code, there is reason to believe that the
Congress would want to hear the individual members of the Court when-
ever considering any broad amendments to the Code. And, while so
doing, there is also reason to believe that the Congress would want to
hear too any other witnesses who might wish to be heard, including wit-
nesses for the armed services. Under such circumstances a civilian ad-
visory council would be in no position to speak with easy authority on
such matters. The most that such a council could do would be to synthe-
size in the form of a bill whatever information was gathered by it. But
this is exactly what the Congress itself does whenever it holds hearings
preparatory to writing a bill. The hearings before the Armed Services
Committees in connection with the military pay bill passed during the
last session of the Congress is an excellent illustration of this synthesizing
at work. The committees not only heard as witnesses members of the
Cordiner Committee but also persons of their own choosing as well as
others who expressed a desire to testify.35
The proposal for establishing a civilian advisory council is essentially
a proposal for creating another committee save only that it would be
a statutory committee with pay. As to this, it is considered that such a
committee would in time share in the evils peculiar to governmental
agencies generally. As every lawyer engaged in the practice of administra-
tive law knows these statutory agencies always begin zealously alive to
the public interest. Soon, however, they come to identify as the public
the litigants that appear before them. And soon they lose the zeal that
promoted their formation as they become rigid in their thoughts and
judgments. The good originally expected of them soon loses much of its
will. The kind of nonpermanent committee typified in the appointment of
the Seymour Committee would seem to be much more desirable for the
Services than the kind of permanent, bureaucratic committee inherent
in Professor Keeffe's proposal since the former would always allow for
a sense of enthusiasm alive to the moment. Moreover, it would preserve
35 Hearings on H.R. 9979 Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on
Armed Services, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on S. 2014 Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1957); Hearings
on S. 2014, S. 3081 and H.R. 11470 Before a Subcommittce of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 85th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1958).
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the committee concept from deteriorating into another example of how
bureaucracy in government grows."'
-3-
The Uniform Code of Military Justice was approved by the Congress
on May 5, 1950 and became effective May 31, 1951. The period between
the two dates, when the Code was approved and when it was to become
effective, was the period of time allowed the armed services to indoctrinate
their personnel in it. It was also the period allowed the Services to pre-
pare, print and publish a manual explanatory of the Code.
For the Navy the Code represented something new in the administra-
tion of military justice. For them the Code constituted a new approach
from that previously followed under the Articles for the Government
of the Navy. Under the circumstances the Navy considered that a good
deal of missionary work would be required in order to insure a smooth
launching of the Code on May 31, 1951.
However, on June 27, 1950-that is, almost eleven months before
the Code was to become effective-President Truman ordered the Army
to aid South Korea and the Navy to protect Formosa against possible ag-
gression and keep the Chinese Nationalist forces from attacking the main-
land. Overnight a period of peace became a time of war. And with the
change came a shift in emphasis as the military knuckled down to the
immediate business at hand. The mood of Congress revealed itself in
formal speeches and in the lobbies, corridors and cloakrooms. Over the
nation a period of gray mobilization set in, with expanded draft quotas,
reserve recalls and accelerated production of the sinews of war."
Meanwhile, in Korea, the war had begun to take on an ominous
form. The soldiers were in a land and among people that most of them
found different, and in a war that all too few of them understood and
none of them wanted. Many of the soldiers were lately trained only in
the softening and vitiating duty of the occupation in Japan. As a result
some officers were unable from time to time to hold their lines of battle
firm and intact. Increasingly the lines wavered as troops abandoned posi-
tions that might have been held. Communication between units became
36 At the time of the hearings on the reorganization of the Department of Defense
during the last session of the Congress, the press indicated that there were upwards of 500
committees in the department. This figure did not seem to include the number of inter-
departmental committees in the separate services. E.g., Wash. Daily News, May 17, 1958,
p. 2, col. 1.
37 TIME, July 17, 1950, p. 11.
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all but nil. The situation was termed fluid and confused, for there were
times when it seemed everybody had everybody else surrounded as the
manpower from China's bottomless well flowed down Korea's central
mountain corridor. 8
With this as the situation the commanders began to worry whether
the anchors at Inchon and Pusan would hold while the troops were
being regrouped for a fight back up the Peninsula. There was real worry
on their part whether we might not actually be pushed off the Pusan
Peninsula entirely. Meanwhile, the people back home began to worry too.
Would Armageddon begin with so feeble a fanfare as the muffled Battle
of Korea? Would the pushbutton war of the physicists start among the
grass roofs of a land where men had hardly caught up with Galileo?
Was this place and was this the way in which Marx and Jefferson would
come to final grips? At the time there was no doubt that the Communist
intention to destroy what order existed in the world had been plainly
published and was being implacably pursued. 9
In due course President Truman recognized the combat situation in
Korea for what it was and took action to strengthen the hands of our
commanders there. With characteristic forthrightness he suspended cer-
tain of the limitations prescribed in the Table of Maximum Punishments
in the Manual for offenses "committed by persons under the command of,
or within any area controlled by, the Commander in Chief, Far East."'
The limitations suspended concerned desertion, aiding or advising another
to desert, absence without leave, assaulting or wilfully disobeying a
superior officer, insubordinate conduct toward a noncommissioned officer,
and misbehavior of sentinels.'1 These were essentially the offenses that
dogged the war from the beginning and almost brought us to our knees.
So, in some ways, it was unfortunate for the Code to become law when
it did. For war is hardly a time to begin a new system of military justice.
War seems to have its own sense of urgency and to respect no other."
3 8 TIME, July 24, 1950, p. 13.
39 TIME, July 10, 1950, p. 7.
40 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1949, par. 117c.
4Exec. Order No. 10149, 15 Fed. Reg. 5149 (1950).
Later, in anticipation of the UCMJ, President Truman suspended the Table of Maxi-
mum Punishments, par. 127c of the new MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,
1951, with respect to the following offenses: Solicitation, desertion, absence without leave,
missing movement, assaulting or wilfully disobeying an officer, insubordinate conduct
toward noncommissioned officer, misbehavior of sentinel and malingering. Exec. Order No.
10247, 16 Fed. Reg. 5035 (1951).
42 Professor Keeffe cites two cases to illustrate the point that an advisory council should
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Three items listed by Professor Keeffe have a common denominator
and therefore blend easily for discussion under one point. He believes
that the staff legal officer's review and the boards of review should be
abolished, and that the Court of Military Appeals should be enlarged and
divided up into panels with direct appeal from the convening authority to
the Court of Military Appeals."3 For ease of handling, these three items
will be discussed in the order stated.
At the outset it should be said that staff legal officer reviews are
not secret documents." There is, of course, no provision in either the
Code or the current Manual which requires that these reviews be dis-
tributed to counsel. Nor is there any prohibition which forbids their
distribution in this manner. On the other hand there are many known
instances of staff legal officers giving copies of their reviews to counsel.
The records themselves often reveal this information. Sometimes a brief
or memorandum of law appended to the record of trial will make specific
mention of the review in the case. Sometimes a brief or memorandum of
law which arrives later in the Office of the Judge Advocate General will
disclose the fact. Sometimes distribution will be noted on the review
itself. Since there is no requirement or prohibition respecting these re-
views, the matter would appear to be one addressed largely to the sound
be appointed. To one of these-the "Doe" case-he gives overriding emphasis. According
to Professor Keeffe, "Doe" stole 32 cases of "C" rations and was sentenced to five years
imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. Professor Keeffe says that the sentence in this
case was too severe.
Now, everything on ration must be drawn out of store each day. How much is drawn
is geared to troop strength from day to day. Rations are not issued for a soldier who
has been committed to a hospital or is absent otherwise from his unit. Nor may rations
be stored up in supply. When viewed in this light it should be clear that the stealing
of 32 cases of rations could very well make the difference whether a number of men eat
or do not eat on a given day. Every soldier who has ever experienced actual warfare is well
aware of the validity of this statement.
Furthermore, in a battle area like Korea nothing has as much real value as food.
Food is the staple of life that keeps body and soul together. As a result food is an ideal
medium of exchange for black-marketeering. In the early days of the Korean War "C"
rations were known to bring on the black-market as much as $10 per ration. With 18
individual rations to the case, it takes little arithmetic to determine how much could be
made from a sale of 32 cases at a going price of $180 per case.
This business therefore of stealing 32 cases of "C" rations in Korea was not exactly
something small.
On the moral side of crime, punishment and rehabilitation, there are two interesting
discourses by the late Pope Pius XII to the Italian Association of Catholic Jurists. THiE
POPE SPEAKS, American Quarterly of Papal Documents (lst Qtr. 1955), pp. 17-40.
43 Keeffe, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 19-2 1.
4Keeffe, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 19.
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discretion of the staff legal officers themselves. Such procedures as have
been followed by these officers in the past would seem to have found
acceptance on the part of counsel. For, the reviewing authorities in the
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy are not aware of any
complaint in this regard having ever been filed in a case.
In several cases the Court of Military Appeals has focused its at-
tention on the problem of the adequacy of staff legal officer reviews.
In these cases the decisions of boards of review were reversed because of
the inadequacy of such reviews, and the records were returned to an
appropriate reviewing authority for further proceedings. These decisions
indicate that a mere literal compliance with the provisions of the Manual
in the preparation of staff legal officer reviews will in instances fail to
provide the legally acceptable review to which the accused is entitled.45
The importance of these cases lies in the repeated categorical state-
ments of the Court that it would expect and require a staff legal officer
to raise the standard of his review to that of a judicial review. While the
minimum standards of reviews by staff legal officers have always been
known, these reviews have not been generally understood as being on the
same level with judicial reviews. This emphasis by the court is vastly
important in that it no longer leaves uncertain the exact position of these
reviews in military law.
4"In United States v. Grice, [8 USCMA 166, 23 CMR 390, (1957)] the Court
stated what it would now require in the implementation of the Code and Manual in the
matter of these reviews. In clear and certain language the Court said: "In pursuing the
advisory function set forth in Article 61, [UCMJ], it is incumbent upon the staff judge
advocate to apply the same legal standards that would be employed by the convening
authority in determining a given legal problem. A staff judge advocate has no command
authority and no test is to be applied by him except in his capacity as legal adviser to the
commander. His advice, therefore, must utilize the standards that the commander himself
would use."
In the Grice case, supra, it appeared that the staff judge advocate advised the convening
authority that since the court-martial had seen and heard the witnesses and resolved a factual
issue against the accused, he (the staff judge advocate) "may not disagree with that de-
cision." The Court considered such advice erroneous because it indicated that the staff
judge advocate had considered himself bound by the findings of the court-martial on ques-
tions of fact. Since the staff judge advocate has no authority or function but to advise his
commander, the Court concluded that the advice was tantamount to informing him that
he too was bound by the court's findings. In United States v. Johnson [8 USCMA 173, 23
CMR 397 (1957)] the staff judge advocate, after discussing the evidence presented, said,
"where as here there is sufficient legally admissible evidence to support their findings,
it should not be disturbed." The Court ordered a new review because the quoted language
was capable of bL.ing interpreted as applying the stricter appellate rule of legal sufficiency
involving sufficiency as a matter of law and not of fact. Again, in United States v. Katzen-
berger, [8 USCMA 497, 24 CMR 307 (1957),] where the defense of alibi was raised,
this comment of the staff judge advocate required reversive action: "Also, the court saw
and heard the witnesses (a privilege not accorded reviewing authorities); thus, the court's
1959]
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Besides being notable in this respect these cases also show in practical
application the manner in which the Court goes about bringing, in time,
evolution to the administration of military justice.
The boards of review in the Navy enjoy virtual autonomy in their
operations."" Except for certain logistic support in the form of office space,
clerical help, supplies and pay, the boards conduct their business com-
pletely independent of the Office of the Judge Advocate General. Ap-
proximately half the membership of the boards is composed of civilians.
Furthermore, the boards are the masters of their own opinions in the
same manner as a three-man court. The ratio decidendi is that required
in a particular case: it is set out by the author and adopted by at least one
concurring member; and, once pronounced, the statements remain in the
opinion without change. Much the same might be said of Appellate Gov-
ernment and Appellate Defense Counsel. Some of the most experienced
attorneys in the Office of the Judge Advocate General are assigned as
determination should not be disturbed unless the denial of the accused as to the allegation
and the testimony of the witness supporting his alleged movements is such that no rea-
sonable person could disbelieve it." See also United States v. Fields, 9 USCMA 70, 25
CMR 322 (1958); United States v. Westrich, 9 USCMA 82, 25 CMR 344 (1958);
United States v. Bennie, No. 11, 884, dec'd January 30, 1959.
In other cases the Court has stated that a staff legal officer's review "must do more than
summarize; it must also advise." United States v. Fleming, 8 USCMA 729, 25 CMR 233
(1958). That it must contain a reasoned evaluation of both the legal and factual sufficiency
of the evidence. United States v. Westrich, 9. USCMA, 82, 25 CMR 344 (1958); United
States v. Acker, 9 USCMA 80, 25 CMR 342 (1958); United States v. Howes, 9 USCMA
78, 25 CMR 340 (1958). That it must make a factual evaluation of the proof against
the back-drop of the "reasonable doubt" standard. United States v. Romero, 8 USCMA
524, 25 CMR 28 (1957). That it must individualize the clemency recommendation without
regard to a particular command policy or viewpoint. United States v. Wise, 6 USCMA
472, 20 CMR 188 (1955); United States v. Peterson, 8 USCMA 241, 24 CMR 51 (1957);
United States v. Plummer, 7 USCMA 630, 23 CMR 94 (1957).
The recital by staff legal officers in their reviews of matter adverse to the accused has
recently drawn the Court's attention. In United States v. Vara, [8 USCMA 651, 25 CMR
155 (1958)] the Court has suggested that a copy of the post-trial review, or at least the
clemency portion thereof, be served upon the accused or his counsel some time prior to
the action of the convening authority and early enough so that a reply to the latter may
be submitted or a brief filed before the board of review. Accord, United States v. Smith,
9 USCMA 145, 24 CMR 407 (1958). While the Court has recognized that wide dis-
cretion must be afforded staff judge advocates and legal officers in their determination of the
matters to be included in their reviews, the Court has indicated that "the exercise of this
discretion is of course a proper subject of consideration upon appeal." United States v.
Fields, 9 USCMA 70, 25 CMR 332, 337 (1958).
46 For purposes of military law a board of review is a judicial body. United States v.
Whitman, 3 USCMA 179, 11 CMR 179 (1953); United States v. Reeves, 1 USCMA 388,
3 CMR 122 (1952); United States v. Brasher, 2 USCMA 50, 6 CMR 50 (1952).
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counsel. Their briefs are the result of their own efforts and they remain
the product of their own creation. 7
The most that has ever been expected of all these is that they de-
velop fully in their briefs and arguments and decisions basic concepts
of policy and principle, stressing not only the rules but the reasons behind
the rules. They are expected to aid in the development of sound and en-
during principles of law without regard to the effect that such principles
may have on the individual case under review. And they are conscious
of the thought that with the development of such a framework of law,
the traditional military concept of court-martial ought to fade in time
into the past.
There are a total of 17 boards of review in the Army, Navy, Air
Force and Coast Guard. By law these boards consist of three members
each, for a total of 51 people. In the year ending December 31, 1957
these 17 boards reviewed a total of 12,193 cases."' Thus, if the member-
ship of the Court of Military Appeals were to be increased in order to
provide for direct appeal from the convening authority, the membership
would have to be substantially increased for the Court to accommodate
any such number of cases. The Court could, of course, establish some sort
of screening process by which commissioners would dispose of certain
cases. But this approach would hardly seem desirable since under it the
approval of findings and sentences would in the last analysis represent
little more than the frailities of one person's view. The basic thought be-
hind the creation of the appellate procedures in the Code was to vest an
accused with a right to more complete reviews in terms of legal standards
than he had been entitled to under prior law. In this way it was considered
that an ultimate finding of guilty and sentence thereon would represent
47 Boards of Review evolved as the result of slow but steady development in the ad-
ministration of military justice over a span of 30 years. Army boards date from World
War I. It was in 1918 that the War Department promulgated General Order No. 7 re-
quiring review by a board in the Office of the Judge Advocate General before any serious
sentence could be carried into execution. The essential provisions of this Order became
statutory in 1920 as Article of War 50 . This was modified by Article of War 50 in the
1948 revision of the Articles of War. The latter empowered boards to weigh evidence,
judge the credibility of witnesses and determine controverted questions of fact.
The right of a board to affirm only such findings of guilty as it finds correct in law
and fact remains the same today. The greatest single change brought about in the powers
and duties of the boards under UCMJ is the power to affirm only so much of the sentence
as it finds appropriate. As provided for today this discretionary power is limited only by the
provisions of the statute violated as further limited by the Table of Maximum Punishments.
Boards of Review in the Navy date from 1950 when they were established in the
Office of the Judge Advocate in anticipation of the UCMJ.
48 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY AP-
PEALS AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES 29
(1957).
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the competent legal views of many rather than just a few people. It is
true that some states do not have intermediate appellate tribunals com-
parable to the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and that appeals in these states
lie directly with the Supreme Court of the states. But these courts do not
handle anywhere near the case load processed by boards of review in the
course of a year's time.
The principal task of the Court of Military Appeals is to be the final
arbiter of the law applicable to courts-martial.4" It is the Court's responsi-
bility to build a simple unified framework of the principles of military
criminal law within which the court-martial system can function effec-
tively. The proposal that the Court be enlarged in order to provide panels
for direct appeal from the convening authority contains at least one serious
practical limitation in this respect. For, in time these panels would only
bring forth varying interpretations of the law as is much the case with
appellate tribunals generally. The law is a pragmatic science and the
men who administer it rarely deal with the absolute. Questions of how
49 After consultation with members of the Court of Military Appeals, Representative
Philbin (Massachusetts) has introduced H.R. 4040 in the present session of the Congress.
While the bill falls short of gaining life tenure for Court members, it nevertheless is de-
signed to enhance the dignity and standing of the Court and to clarify its status. Specifically,
the bill will:
(a) Raise the Court to the level of the highest (Supreme) court of a territory by
equating the rights, etc., of the judges to those of a Court of Appeals without going so
far as to give them life tenure.
(b) Confirm the standing of the Court as already recognized by many, but not all,
of the Federal Courts. A notable example of recognition of the already high standing of
the Court of Military Appeals was given by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Shaw v United States, [209 F. 2d 811 (1954)]. By inclusion of the Chief Judge in the
Judicial Conference, the Court is recognized as an integral part of the judicial branch of
the government.
(c) Eliminate any vestige of control by the Executive. The provision in the UCMJ
for removal of a judge by the President has been dropped. Henceforth, removal would be
accomplished by impeachment in the same manner as a Court of Appeals member. The bill
also transfers the right of designating a judge of the Court of Appeals to fill a temporary
vacancy from the President to the Chief Justice.
(d) Take the judges and Court employees out from under the Civil Service Com-
mission and eliminate any control by that body.
(e) Eliminate certain provisions such as that requiring that no more than two
judges may belong to the same party. The latter are more appropriate to an administrative
agency or a commission than a court.
The bill is concerned entirely with the internal structure of the Court, its consti-
tution and the individual rights, etc., of its members. It in no way enlarges or diminishes
the jurisdiction of the Court. Its position remains unchanged and there will be no impact
whatsoever on substantive military law.
On the theory that a court of enhanced dignity and standing can be expected to
render even greater service, it would appear that the bill ought to be enacted by the
Congress even though there is no provision for life tenure. (A Democratic congress is not
likely to grant life tenure to a court, two of whose members are Republicans.)
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far and how much constantly intrude, and the questions of degree they
introduce require for their solution determination of doubtful facts and
comparative valuing of interests which have no institutional equivalents.
In the very nature of things, if the court-martial system is to function as it
must, there can be no room in it for conflicting interpretations of law that
are all equal in authoritative importance. Hence, there would be some
question whether the court could possibly discharge its mandate if this
proposal to abolish the boards of review were ever given serious con-
sideration.
-5-
Another recommendation by Professor Keeffe is that there should
be a top clemency board on equal standing with the Court of Military
Appeals." The function of this board would be to receive petitions from
accused who are dissatisfied with their sentences and to oversee in some
manner the equalizing of sentences. The board would be a statutory board
and would report annually to the Congress.
Clemency in the Navy is a matter about which not too much is
really known. Now, the Code provides a number of "built-in" clemency
features for use in the administration of military justice. These features
begin with the commander who convened the court. In addition to ap-
proving, disapproving or modifying a sentence, the convening authority
may exercise the power of clemency.5 The boards of review have, in ad-
dition to the power to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of wit-
nesses and determine controverted questions of fact, also the power to
exercise clemency in a case.52 The boards are fully conversant with their
50 Keeffe, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 13.
51 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, par. 88c.
52UCMJ, Art 66(c). In explaining this power the Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Lanford [6 USCMA 371, 378, 20 CMR 87, 94 (1955,] said: "One of
the principal matters Congress considered at the time of the enactment of the Uniform
Code was the establishment of a procedure for review of the sentence which would insure
a fair and just punishment for every accused. To achieve that purpose, Congress gave the
convening authority the power to approve a sentence in his discretion. But it made his
decision subject to review by a board of review. United States v. Brasher, 2 USCMA 50,
6 CMR 50; United States v. Cavallaro, 3 USCMA 653, 14 CMR 71. The name by which
the board's power is denominated is really unimportant. What is important is that, within
the limitations of its own authority, the board of review can, in the interests of justice,
substantially lessen the rigor of a legal sentence. The board of review, therefore, can be
compassionate; it can be lenient; it can be forbearing. If one prefers to call the influence of
those human qualities in the mitigation of a sentence the exercise of the judicial function
of determining legal appropriateness, the description is proper. Tah Do Quah v. State, 62
Okla Cr 139, 70 P2d 818. On the other hand, if one wishes to call it clemency, that de-
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responsibility in this matter, and are quick to recognize a grant of clemency
in a meritorious case. In one case, for instance, the board characterized
the clemency action of the convening authority as "leadership at its very
finest."" These commendatory remarks by the board resulted in the
Secretary of the Navy's awarding the convening authority a letter of
commendation." Even though the Court of Military Appeals may not
reduce a sentence under the provisions of the Code, nevertheless the Court
does indirectly exercise this power in appropriate instances. The Court
does this by returning a case to the Judge Advocate General for reference
to a board of review for determination of an "appropriate sentence.""
In this matter of clemency the Judge Advocate General has a vital
role under the Code. In this connection the Code provides:
"The Secretary of the Department, and when designated by him any Under
Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Judge Advocate General, or commanding officer
may remit or suspend any part or amount of the unexecuted portion of any
sentence, including all uncollected forfeitures, other than a sentence approved
by the President.""16
The report of the Committee on Armed Services which accompanied the
Code to the House explained this article as follows:
"Under this article the Secretary of a department may review the sentence of
any court martial, which will give him clemency and parole powers as well as
ultimate control of sentence uniformity."
7
Thus, the Congress installed the Secretary of the Navy as the ultimate
controller of clemency in Navy sentences. Pursuant to this requirement
of law the Secretary has delegated to the Judge Advocate General the
power to suspend and remit any part or amount of the unexecuted portion
of any sentence, including all uncollected forfeitures, other than a sentence
approved by the President of the United States." Under this authority
the Judge Advocate General reviews the sentences of all court-martial
scription also is proper. The title applied to the power matters little, so long as it is clearly
understood that the law invests boards of review with the power to treat 'an accused with
less rigor than their authority permits.' United States v. Cavallaro, supra, page 655."
53 Rosenthal, WC NCM 57 00279, dec'd September 27, 1957.
5
4
JAG JOURNAL (Navy), February 1958, p. 2.
1"United States v. Crawford, 4 USCMA 701, 16 CMR 275 (1954); United States
v. Keith, 1 USCMA 442, 4 CMR 34 (1952).
50UCMJ, Art. 74(a).
57 H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1949).
58 1955 NAVAL SUPPLEMENT To THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 1951, sec. 0113a.
[Vol. Vill
JAG JUSTICE TODAY
cases received in his office for appropriateness of sentence and further
clemency. This examination is made, as a rule, after final action by the
board of review or Court of Military Appeals in a case. In the exercise
of this clemency power the Judge Advocate General is not limited to
matters appearing in the record of trial. He may, and he does, consider
matters outside the record of proceedings. Over a period of time the
Judge Advocate General has reduced the sentences in five to ten per cent
of the cases involving punitive discharges.
Aside from these "built-in" features of clemency in the Code, the
United States Naval Clemency Board exists as another source of clemency.
This board was established pursuant to precept by the Secretary of the
Navy to make recommendations relative to the exercise of the residual
clemency power vested in the Secretary in respect to men serving sentences.
The board considers for clemency cases involving an unsuspended punitive
discharge, confinement in excess of eight months or confinement less than
eight months in exceptionally meritorious cases (hardship, etc.). The
board may initiate clemency on its own motion in any case in which the
exercise of clemency appears appropriate. A prisoner serving a sentence
of eight to 24 month's confinement is eligible for consideration after com-
pletion of four months and annually thereafter. One with more than 24
month's confinement may be considered after completion of six months
and then annually thereafter. For a sentence of less than eight months
the board will consider a request for clemency any time before the
sentence is completely executed. A punitive discharge may not be executed
prior to action of the board unless the person has waived his right to
request restoration. A person confined in a federal prison is entitled
to the same annual review of his case by the board as all other naval
prisoners.
The board is required to submit for Secretarial approval recommenda-
tions in every case considered by it. In reaching these recommendations
the board considers the background of the prisoner, his civil and military
history, his adjustment in confinement or while awaiting completion of
appellate review if not confined, motivation for future service, the nature
and circumstances of the current offense, the recommendations of the
commanding officer and local clemency board, report of the psychiatrist
stationed at the confinement facility, and the recommendation of the Chief
of Naval Personnel or Commandant of the Marine Corps as appropriate.
The award of clemency by the Secretary on recommendation of this
board is completely separate from the legal aspects of a case, and is
based in part on the wishes, attitude and conduct of the prisoner, and
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largely on his rehabilitation possibilities, and also all other information
about his personal history before or after the offense for which he was
convicted and which might have no connection with that offense. In
this connection the board will entertain the testimony of any witness
whom the prisoner might wish to be heard. Among others, the board has
heard in the past the testimony of the prisoner's family, friends and former
superior officers, as well as social workers and counsel for the prisoner.
As may be seen the Secretarial precept permits the board to exercise a
wide amount of discretion in recommending clemency."9
If the clemency opportunities in the military are compared with
those in civilian life, it will be readily observed that nowhere is a civilian
defendant afforded so many clemency opportunities as is a military
accused. For, prior to confinement a civilian defendant is given only one
such opportunity through the referral of his case to a probation officer
in a federal district court."0 And after confinement a civilian defendant is
5 SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5810.6C, March 4, 1958, pp. 1-8 (Dept. of the Navy,
Office of the Sec'y).
Besides these enumerated sources of clemency, there are three additional possible
avenues of relief: (a) the Navy Discharge Review Board authorized by Section 301, Service-
men's Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended [38 U.S.C. 693h], (b) the Board for Cor-
rection of Naval Records authorized by Section 207, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
as amended [5 U.S.C. 191a] and (c) appeal to the President for pardon.
A death sentence requires approval of the appropriate Secretary and the President
before it can be carried into execution. This requirement is an additional "built-in"
clemency feature in cases in which the supreme penalty has been adjudged. UCMJ,
Art. 71 (a).
In passing, it may be interesting to note that the Naval Clemency Board has been
in existence for over 30 years. Its mission relative to clemency has remained unchanged
since it was established on February 7, 1928 by the Honorable Curtis D. Wilbur, then
Secretary of the Navy. The name too has remained the same except that from 1943 to 1947,
it was called Naval Clemency and Prison Inspection Board and from then to January
1951, it was known as the Naval Sentence Review and Clemency Board.
60 The Manual provides that evidence of previous convictions may be used as evidence
in aggravation. This evidence, however, must relate to offenses committed during a current
enlistment, voluntary extension of enlistment, appointment, or other engagement or obliga-
tion for service of the accused, and during the three years next preceding the commission
of any offense of which the accused stands convicted. When the last enlistment, appoint-
ment, or other engagement or obligation for service was terminated under other than
honorable conditions, or when the accused deserted and subsequently fraudulently enlisted,
all convictions by courts-martial of offenses committed in the prior term of service, if
within the three-year period, are admissible. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 1951, par. 75b(2).
If this rule in the military service is compared with the rule followed in civilian life,
some things become apparent. The Probation Officer's report, which constitutes evidence in
aggravation and mitigation for determining punishment in a case, contains a full list of a
man's previous convictions in civilian life. The list details not only convictions for serious
offen.es but also for minor offenses as well (trafic violation, etc.). It includes convictions
from all jurisdictions without regard to State or Federal jurisdictional lines. And unlike
in the military service, the list includes convictions over the ihole rpan of a man's ife.
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afforded only one avenue of clemency-this time, the federal probation
system. Of course, a civilian defendant can appeal to the President of
the United States for a pardon whenever he believes his case deserving of
this consideration.
The cry of evil about the administration of military justice is often
tied to the sentence adjudged by a court-martial. Seldom is this impres-
sion removed later by publicizing with equal vigor the sentence that was
finally approved and which the accused actually served. It would seem
that the measure whether a sentence in military law is substantially rea-
sonable and just ought to be the sentence remaining after final mitigation.
Certainly a sentence adjudged by a court-martial has as much basis in the
order of reality as a sentence adjudged by a civil criminal court.
For instance in the Navy, for the period of March 1, 1957 through
February 28, 1958, the convening and supervisory authorities suspended
the punitive discharge on probation in 756 cases. A follow-up study
later indicated that approximately 50 per cent of these suspensions were
successful-that is, that the accused had not become involved in other
court-martial proceedings or had not had their suspensions otherwise
vacated within the period for which their sentences were suspended. In
a great many instances the convening and supervisory authorities them-
selves reduced the sentences to confinement and forfeiture of pay.
In the six month period ending June 30, 1956, the median sentence
in the Navy for prisoners committed was 6.7 months; for the period end-
ing December 31, 1956, 6.5 months; for the period ending June 30, 1957,
6.1 months; for the period ending December 31, 1957, 6.4 months; and
for the latest period for which statistics are available ending June 30,
1958, 6.2 months. On the basis of time served by the prisoners during
these periods, these statistics reflect a median sentence of 5.1, 4.9, 4.9,
4.9, and 4.6 months, respectively. These statistics take into consideration
all sentences to confinement, including long-term sentences, served in the
retraining commands. The only sentences not reflected are the sentences
being served under the federal penal system.
The semiannual reports containing these61 and similar statistice are
distributed to the various commands at the time of publication. Actual
and prospective court members, convening and supervisory authorities,
1 NAVY-MARINE CORPS PRISONERS, SEMI-ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT,
1 January-30 June 1956; 1 July-31 December 1956; 1 January-30 June 1957; 1 July-31
December 1957; 1 January-30 June 1958 (Dept. of the Navy, Bureau of Personnel, Cor-
rective Services Division).
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boards of review, as well as the Judge Advocate General will usually be
impressed by the consensus of their peers throughout the Navy and of
their superiors in the chain of review. Through the regular publication
of such statistics the Navy places a continuing emphasis on the clemency
aspects of punishment.
The recommendation for establishing a top clemency board contains
the proposition that the board should be a permanent one created by
statute. Without restating what was said earlier about the rigidity of the
civilian advisory council concept, all said there is equally applicable here.
Moreover, this recommendation should cause men to pause at the impli-
cation inherent in it, since in the military neither discipline nor clemency
can operate effectively in a vacuum. Nor can one function without the
other. If the prime responsibility for the exercise of clemency were ever
divorced from the chain of command, military discipline would no longer
be the personal thing that it is.
-6-
The bete noire woven through the whole of Professor Keeffe's piece
is command control. The inference here is that Professor Keeffe equates
command control of courts-martial with command influence over courts-
martial. It would seem that he regards all command control as evil com-
mand control.
At the time the Code as drafted by the Morgan Committee was sub-
mitted to the Armed Services Committees for consideration recommenda-
tions were also made by critics and protagonists of command control.
One bar association strongly recommended an independent judicial system
within the Services which would take over a court-martial case once it
had been referred to trial. 2 Another critic of command control stated the
proposed Code would not accomplish the desired result of achieving a
real system of military justice unless command control was entirely
eliminated." However, most of the opponents of command control con-
ceded that it would be impracticable to place the administration of mili-
tary justice entirely in the hands of civilians. But to remove the control
of commanders it was urged that the Judge Advocates General be given
the authority to convene courts-martial, with the added authority to
62 Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed
Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 633, 636 (1949).
38 Id., at 646.
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appoint the members and counsel. 4. Advocates of this procedure likewise
envisaged the establishment of a separate Judge Advocate General's Corps
in each Service to insure freedom from command control. " On the other
hand, champions of retention of command control were prone to point
out that some element of supervision was essential to preserve the effective-
ness of the nation's fighting forces. This viewpoint was best stated by
Secretary of the Army Robert Patterson in the following words:
"Many of the critics overlook the place of military justice in the Army or
the Navy. An army is organized to view victory in war and the organization
must be one that will bring success in combat. This means singleness of
command and the responsibility of the commander for everything that goes on
in the field * * * And when critics say you ought to have a completely
independent judiciary, they overlook the primary purpose of the army, namely
safeguarding the nation and winning the war."
66
After weighing all the arguments respecting command control the
Armed Services Committees recommended to the Congress passage of a
code substantially in the form drafted by the Morgan Committee. The
House subcommittee in its report to the Congress stated that "perhaps
the most troublesome question presented was that of command control."
It considered moving the authority to convene courts-martial from
"command" and placing that authority in judge advocates or legal officers
or at least in a superior command. However, the subcommittee subse-
quently rejected these notions, stating:
"We fully agree that such a provision might be desirable if it were practicable,
but we are of the opinion that it is not practicable. We cannot escape the
fact that the law which we are now writing will be as applicable and must
be as workable in time of war as in time of peace, and, regardless of any
desires which may stem from an idealistic conception of justice, we must
avoid the enactment of provisions which will unduly restrict those who are
responsible for the conduct of our military operations."
67
The avoidance of evil command control would appear to have been
precisely the reason for which the Congress rejected the Judicial Council
concept and created for the first time a court in the person of the Court
of Military Appeals."8 Since its formation the Court has expressed its
64 Id., notes 62, 63.
65 Id., notes 62, 63.
66Patterson, The Proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice, HARV. L. SCHOOL
RECORD, March 23, 1949, p. 2, col. 5.
67H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949).
68 Id.
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views in upwards of 100 cases on the subject of command control alone."9
Some of the more important cases are cited infra.
The first case dealing specifically with command control was United
States v. Gordon."0 Here the Court dealt with factors which disqualified
an officer from convening a court. In such a situation the prejudice to
the accused arises from a presumption that unlawful influence might be
exerted rather than from acts which amount to the actual exercise of such
influence. The Court established the criterion by which it would determine
when the convening authority is an accuser in a case. In its holding the
Court rejected the test long used in military law that the personal animus
of a convening authority must be shown. The Court ruled that the test
should be whether the convening authority "was so closely connected to
the offense that a reasonable person would conclude that he had a personal
interest in the matter." In United States v. Jewson"' the Court applied
the principle that a convening authority who directs an investigation while
acting in line of duty is not to be regarded as an accuser. Apropos to this,
the Court remarked that to hold otherwise would "extend the rationale
of the Gordon case beyond the limits of its logic." The point present was
that the person who signed the charge sheet and had thereby become the
actual accuser, had made no personal investigation of the matter. He had
obtained his facts only through the investigation directed by the com-
manding general who subsequently convened the court. And, in United
States v. Smith"2 the question whether the convening authority was dis-
qualified on the theory that by directing amendment of the charges he
had become a prosecutor, was presented for consideration. In rejecting
this proposition the Court stated that the convening authority is by
statute charged with the duty of deciding the nature and severiy of the
offenses to be tried and the type of court to decide the issues. It was the
Court's view that the action of a convening authority in ordering an
accused tried on a greater offense than the first one alleged is not of such
11 The Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Clay [1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74
(1951)) laid down the general pattern it intended to follow in instances of command
control when it spun the doctrine of military due process. This doctrine is fundamental
to any issue of command control since it is based upon the congressional intent to place as
reasonably as possible military justice on the same plane as civilian justice. The Bill of
Rights was originally adopted not because its provisions had previously been violated but
so all might know that they were never to be violated. The doctrine in the Clay case,
supra, would appear to stand precisely upon the same plane.
701 USCMA 255, 2 CMR 161 (1952).
7 1 USCMA 652, 5 CMR 80 (1952).
728 USCMA 178, 23 CMR 402 (1957). Holding in Smith case adopted by federal
court. Accord. Jackson v. McElroy, 163 F. Supp. 257 (Dist. Col. 1958).
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a personalized nature as to disqualify him from further performing his
official duties.
A commander's control over the court-martial system extends
through the chain of command to subordinate commanders charged with
certain responsibilities in the disposition of court-martial charges. The
Court of Military Appeals has recognized the responsibility of a com-
mander for matters pertaining to discipline within his command, even
indicating that he would be abdicating his duties if he ignored disciplinary
problems. In one case, the Court remarked:
"° * * the responsibility of a commanding officer for the maintenance of disci-
pline within his command and the proper conduct of courts-martial cannot be
questioned. In matters of discipline, failure to curb the unlawful tendencies
of his subordinates may demonstrate lack of capacity to command."
73
In this connection there is the case of United States v. Hawthorne 7
wherein the Court enunciated the principle that the exercise of proper
command responsibility in administering the military justice system
may become unlawful command influence when it directly tends to con-
trol judicial processes rather than merely attempting to improve the
discipline of the command. In this case a commanding general published
a policy directive concerning elimination of offenders. The order outlined
statistics reflecting a much greater proportion of offenses committed by a
group as against those by inductees. In pertinent manner the order pro-
vided that any charge against a soldier with two admissible previous con-
victions should be referred to a general court-martial in order that the
provisions in the Manual regarding the award of a sentence to bad conduct
discharge upon proof of two or more previous convictions, could be uti-
lized. Citing this directive the commanding officer recommended that
Hawthorne be tried. He was convicted and sentenced to a punitive dis-
charge, total forfeitures and confinement for one year. In setting aside
the verdict the Court in a split decision stated that the policy directive
was an attempt to control judicial processes since the directive denied to
the accused's immediate commander and other commanders in the chain
of command their discretionary power to reach an independent decision
regarding disposition of the case.
Commanders exercise their greatest control over the court-martial
system in its pretrial stages. And it is here that unlawful command in-
73 United States v. Isbell, 3 USCMA 782, 14 CMR 200 (1954).
747 USCMA 293, 22 CMR 83 (1956).
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fluence can mostly be exerted. For command influence can become part
of the appointment of a court-martial when the convening authority
chooses personnel who might merely express his desires rather than use
independent judgment in deciding a case. As to this, in United States
v Deain5 three officers of a general court-martial were permanent mem-
bers with the senior officer assigned the duty of preparing and submitting
to the convening authority fitness reports on the other two members.
The Court of Military Appeals held in this situation that the appointment
of a senior officer charged with the duty of keeping other members in
line and preventing the exercise of their independent judgment constituted
prejudicial error.
The first important case on the question when a command may give
pretrial instruction to court members as authorized in the Manual was
United States v. Littrice." In this case the executive officer on behalf of
the commanding officer held an instruction period for court members
immediately prior to trial of the accused for larceny. This officer read
an excerpt from an Army headquarters circular on pretrial instruction after
which he advised the members that they should not usurp the preroga-
tives of the convening authority in the matter of sentences since court-
martial records were thoroughly reviewed by higher headquarters. He
then read portions of a letter from the theater commander to the con-
vening authority entitled: "Retention of Thieves in the Army." This letter
called attention to inappropriate sentences given convicted thieves in past
cases. It advised that court members should be selected with care and
be best qualified by reason of age, education, training, experience, length
of service and judicial temperament, and noted that where court members
have verified by their performance these qualities, the fact should be recog-
nized by appropriate notation in efficiency reports or by other written com-
munication. In reversing the case the Court of Military Appeals said that
under the facts there appeared a definite attempt to exert unlawful com-
mand influence. The Court found particularly obnoxious the provision
relating to efficiency reports. As to the policy concerning retention of
thieves, the Court observed: "It is one thing to announce a general policy
and yet another to use that principle to influence the finding and a sentence
in a particular case."
755 USCMA 44, 17 CMR 44 (1954).
763 USCMA 487, 13 CMR 43 (1953).
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This specific problem was again raised in United States v. Isbell" in
which the accused was convicted of larceny and housebreaking. Here a
letter identical to the one in the Littrice case had been disseminated within
the command. In addition the staff judge advocate circulated a bulletin to
all officers in the command for future guidance. The bulletin reviewed
errors and irregularities of previous courts-martial and pertinently re-
ferred to improper acquittals and inadequate sentences. All except one
of the court members acknowledged on voir dire familiarity with the
communications but denied they would be influenced by them. In a split
decision the Court of Military Appeals affirmed the principle expressed in
the Littrice case. It distinguished that case from the instant case by saying
the commander's letter was read to the court members immediately prior
to trial, whereas in the instant case the distribution of the bulletin and
commander's letter was made prior to the commission of the offenses of
which the accused was convicted and prior to the appointment of the court.
The Court of Military Appeals has equally condemned any attempt
to exert unlawful command influence during the trial of cases whether
by the convening authority or by any other officer including a member
of the court itself. Here, in United States v. Whitley"8 the membership
of a special court-martial was reduced by challenge to three ensigns.
During direct examination of the first witness the president of the court
sustained a defense objection to rambling by the witness. The trial counsel
then obtained a recess after which he advised the court that a new and
more qualified president was to be appointed. This was subsequently ac-
complished by the addition of a new member senior in rank. On appeal
the Court of Military Appeals termed the action of the convening au-
thority as contravening both the spirit and letter of the Manual since it
imposed command control over the very heart of the judicial process, and
concluded that this was command control in one of its most serious
aspects. In United States v. Guest 9 the trial court was recessed for an
out-of-court hearing by the law officer to hear arguments on a motion
for a finding of not guilty. The acting staff judge advocate, who had been
a spectator at the trial, furnished the president with a board of review de-
cision pertaining to the motion. When the court reopened the law officer
granted the defense motion subject to objection by the court. After argu-
ment by counsel the president asked trial counsel to read the portions
77 Isbell, Op. cit. supra note 73.
785 USCMA 786, 19 CMR 82 (1955).
793 USCMA 147, 11 CMR 147 (1953).
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of the board of review decision previously shown the president by the
staff judge advocate. In a strongly worded opinion the Court of Military
Appeals considered the conduct of both the acting staff judge advocate
and the president to be highly improper and the interference of this officer
in the proceedings to be a very serious instance of unlawful command
control. In United States v. Fowle ° a command directive concerning re-
tention of thieves in the service was brought to the attention of the court
by trial counsel after the findings and prior to sentence. Using the Littrice
case as precedent, the Court of Military Appeals found this to be unlawful
command influence amounting to prejudicial error.
This doctrine the Court extended in United States v. Estrada81 wherein
the accused was charged with larceny. Prior to sentencing, the trial counsel
invited the court's attention to a policy directive of the Secretary of the
Navy on the retention of thieves and others convicted of offenses involv-
ing moral turpitude. Although in this instance the directive was not read
to the court and despite the added fact that the directive advised discretion
to be used in individual cases, the Court of Military Appeals found pre-
judicial error and ordered a rehearing as to the sentence, stating that "it is
futile to suggest that members of the court disregard the Secretary of
the Navy's policy." Along these same lines is United States v. Rinehart2
in which the Court extended the rationale of these cases to include the
practice of using the Manual by members of a general court-martial or spe-
cial court-martial (except the president) during the course of the trial
or while deliberating on the findings and sentence. The Court directed
the discontinuance of the use of the Manual in this manner, stating that
the only appropriate source of law applicable to any case is the law
officer and that the court members are not to look to outside sources for
the law either as to the findings or the sentence.
Not only must the members of the court-martial be free from influ-
ence, but also must the law officer be independent in the exercise of his
judicial functions. In United States v. Knudson"2 the accused was tried for
an act of sodomy of which he had been previously convicted by a civilian
criminal court. The defense requested a continuance pending receipt of an
answer to a letter forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy regarding a
policy against a second trial in such cases. The law officer granted the
defense request but the convening authority directed him to resume the
807 USCMA 349, 22 CMR 139 (1956).
817 USCMA 635, 23 CMR 99 (1957).
828 USCMA 402, 24 CMR 212 (1957).
as4 USCMA 587, 16 CMR 161 (1954).
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proceedings. The Court of Military Appeals decided that the law officer
had abdicated his power to the convening authority who had no right to
review interlocutory rulings made by the law officer while a case is in
progress. Again, in United States v. Stringer4 the president of the court-
martial remarked after certain evidence had been introduced that the case
was not ready for trial and that unless the case was better prepared the
court might hang an innocent man. The law officer advised the court that
the responsibility for preparation of the case was with the prosecution, and
that the court should acquit the accused if they find the evidence not
sufficient for conviction. Because of these remarks the convening authority
withdrew the charges on the next day and ordered a rehearing. The Court
of Military Appeals reaffirmed the principle enunciated in the Knudson
case that the law officer and not the convening authority is responsible
for the conduct of a trial, and that the latter cannot assume the funcions
of the former since the thrust of legislative intent granted autonomy to
the court. The Court had previously elaborated on this matter of legis-
lative intent in United States v. Keith.85 In that case the Court established
the criterion it would expect of law officers in performing their duties
under the Code in the following language:
"[T~he complete independence of the law member and his unshackled free-
dom from direction of any sort or nature are, we entertain no doubt, vital,
integral, even crucial elements of the legislative effort to immunize oppor-
tunity for the exercise of control over the court-martials process by any
agency of command."
Normally the same personal interest or connection with a case which
would make out a convening authority to be an accuser on the pretrial
level would also preclude his review of a record of trial on the posttrial
level. In United States v. Duffy"6 the convening authority agreed with the
findings of the court-martial but disapproved the recommendations of his
staff judge advocate who had found reversible error based upon an in-
admissible confession. In forwarding the record of trial for appellate
review the convening authority stated that the error was a "technical
failure" and that he was "loath to permit a man whose guilt was plain to
escape his just punishment because of a technicality." The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals held that convening authorities are not free to brush aside
substantial rights secured by mandate of Congress and termed the conduct
845 USCMA 122, 17 CMR 122 (1954).
85 1 USCMA 442, 4 CMR 34 (1952).
863 USCMA 20, 11 CMR 20 (1953).
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in the instant case not only unlawful but lawless. In this area the Court
has also indicated that the convening authority should not be the subject
of command influence in the review of cases. In United States v. Doherty '
the trial court recommended clemency to include remission of the bad
conduct discharge adjudged. Through mistaken interpretation of certain
Navy Department instructions, the convening authority had approved the
punitive discharge with a note to the effect that he could take no clemency
action as to this class of offenders because of these instructions. The Court
held that the convening authority here failed to make the independent
evaluation required of him under the Code. Implicit in this decision is the
corollary that the convening authority may not himself establish an in-
flexible policy to preclude any consideration of clemency. Thus, where the
convening authority as a matter of policy never considered suspending a
punitive discharge, the Court in United States v. Wise" held this to be a
violation of his duty under the Code and Manual to consider each case on
its merits with a view to exercising his powers of clemency.
Now, this rather long recital is by no means a full rationale of the
cases discussed. Many of them come within the definition of landmark
cases in military law and therefore contain much more than what has been
said. Nevertheless, this recital does show in some solid and concrete terms
how the Court of Military Appeals has been meeting the issue of apparent
evil command control in courts-martial. Consequently, there should be
some satisfaction in knowing from the past that the Court in the future
will continue to give to this matter the sense of importance which the
Congress would appear to require, as we all go about maturing in the
administration of military justice under the Code.
-7-
Professor Keeffe recommends that the Congress amend the Uniform
Code of Military Justice to deprive special courts-martial of their present
authority to adjudge a sentence to bad conduct discharge. He considers
that this sentence is too severe to be awarded by a court which does not
have the assistance of a law officer and where counsel are not attorneys.
As an alternative, he suggests that trials before special courts-martial be
conducted in the manner of trials before general courts-martial whenever
there is likelihood of a sentence to bad conduct discharge being adjudged.89
87 5 USCMA 287, 17 CMR 287 (1954).
886 USCMA 472, 20 CMR 188 (1955).
89 Keeffe, JAG Justice in Korea, 6 CATHOLIC U. OF AMER. L. Rv. 1 (1956).
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Although there is this provision in the Code for special courts-martial
to adjudge a sentence to bad conduct discharge, the Army does not permit
its special courts-martial to do so. The reasons for the withdrawal of
this authority in the Army are partly traditional"0 and partly those ad-
vanced by Professor Keeffe. The traditional punishment to punitive dis-
charge in the Army has always been the sentence to dishonorable dis-
charge. And, as a consequence, this form of sentence is adjudged by Army
general courts-martial in far greater number than it is by Navy general
courts-martial. In general it has been the practice in the Navy to reserve
the dishonorable discharge for crimes involving moral turpitude, or the
serious military or naval crimes. Before the Code, Navy courts were
advised that they need not adjudge a dishonorable discharge but may in
lieu thereof adjudge a bad conduct discharge, if they desired to adjudge
a discharge at all." Aside from any other considerations in the matter,
it has always been the Navy's view that a sentence to dishonorable dis-
charge carries with it greater reflection against the discharged serviceman
and, hence, is more likely to interfere with his adjustment in civilian life
than would a sentence to bad conduct discharge.
As everyone knows, the respective military organizations of the Army
and Navy are governed by different military concepts. The Army is totally
a land based organization while the Navy is essentially a seagoing organi-
zation. Every command in the Army is land based, whereas only a few of
the commands in the Navy are shore based. The Army's Table of Or-
ganization provides for a Corps area arrangement, the Navy's for a fleet-
task force arrangement. This arrangement in the Army permits the latter
to locate its smaller commands in reasonable proximity to major com-
mands. This is not the situation in the Navy. For, naval commands
afloat must be constituted to operate as self contained units. They must
be able to operate thousands of miles away from any shore establishment
and, if need be, independently of the other units in a fleet or force. And
with atomic power, they will be able to remain at sea months-on-end since
refueling will no longer be a major problem for them. This fundamental
difference in organizational structure between the two Services should
point up some of the considerations why the Navy cannot be fitted quite
as easily into the same mold as the Army in this matter of special courts-
martial.
90 Prior to the Elston Act, the sentence to bad conduct discharge was traditional only
in the Navy. Both the Army and Air Force inherited it from the Navy when the Elston
Act became law in 1948. Citation note 8, supra.
01 NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS (1937), sec. 456, p. 232.
1959]
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In this connection there are a great many more commands capable
of exercising special court-martial jurisdiction in the Navy than there are
law specialists. Of the latter there are approximately 400 on active duty."2
Because of the wide disparity that exists between the number of com-
mands and law specialists, the Navy has so far not been able to service
all of the commands with them even though the need is there. This fact
in itself discounts the present possibility of providing the four or five law
specialists that would be required if special courts-martial were to be con-
ducted in the manner of general courts-martial. However, to meet this
situation somewhat, the Navy at the moment is thinking in terms of
establishing dockside courts and law centers at shore installations which
service the fleet. These courts and centers would be available to the fleet
as well as shore commands for the trial of accused persons by special
courts-martial. But this arrangement, even in its most optimistic form,
has some very definite and practical limitations, and involves some very
tough administrative and legal problems.
If, for instance, an individual aboard ship is to be tried promptly
for an offense committed by him, this condition would require that not
only the individual but all of the witnesses be flown or otherwise trans-
ported expeditiously to the situs of the court. The number of times that
this could be done by a ship without impairing its state of readiness is
definitely limited since the table of personnel allowance for a ship makes
little provision for any kind of absenteeism. And, in some instances it
might be wholly impractical to comply with this condition because of
location or mission of the ship, or other valid reason, in which case the
individuals would be confined to the brig until either it became practical
to do so or the ship put in at an installation where a court is located.
Under certain circumstances this confinement could extend over a rela-
tively long period of time. This is one illustration of the kind of problem
involved.
While all of this is true, nonetheless, it does not alter the fact that
approximately 90 per cent of the individuals tried in the Navy by special
courts-martial and sentenced to bad conduct discharge, plead guilty. 8
This ratio is in accord with the ratio found in civilian life where ap-
proximately 90 per cent of the persons tried by criminal courts also plead
02 Lawyers in the Navy are known as law specialists, whereas those in the Army and
Air Force are known as judge advocates. The Army and the Air Force each have approxi-
mately 1200 judge advocates on active duty.
93 By personal count of cases extending over a period of approximately three years.
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guilty. Even by the present system, therefore, it would seem that sub-
stantial and equal justice is, in the main, obtained with at least quite as
much certainty as by civil courts. Nor does it alter the fact that many
assigned counsel to special courts-martial show greater devotion to their
clients than criminal attorneys paid marginal fees by defendants in civilian
practice. To paraphrase Anatole France's famous observation, the law,
in its majestic equality, guarantees to the poor as well as the rich the right
to counsel, the right to refrain from self-incrimination, the right to speedy
arraignment. But the knowledgeable know these rights are in civilian
practice often drained of reality to those too poor or ignorant to claim
them. Oftentimes some municipal court hanger-on is assigned to the poor
as counsel and then allowed to squeeze out of them as much of a fee as
their poverty will permit. Alongside this, is the additional fact that the
expectations of a competent defense of the poor must be found in the
zeal of attorneys for justice and their conception of duty as officers of the
court. But this zeal can be tempered by practical necessities which may
subordinate this duty as an officer of the court. The failure of an attorney
here to live up to the idea of public service should not be viewed as moral
failure, but as rather demonstrative of the reality that beyond certain
limits the public cannot expect attorneys to permit moral commitments to
interfere with the material task of earning a livelihood. Under the military
system, however, the devotion and zeal of counsel assigned to special
courts-martial lie in the virtue of their military duty."'
When an individual is discharged from the military service with a
bad conduct discharge, the subject of his discharge ends there insofar as
the particular Service is concerned. The consequences that follow the
individual into civilian life as a result of having been so discharged are
94 The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel in criminal proceedings has had an
interesting history. This right did not originate at common law but was included in the
Sixth Amendment in protest of the existing English practice that prohibited an accused
from being heard by counsel on the issue of guilt in felony cases. Annot., 3 A.L.R. 2d
1003, 1009 (1949). For almost 150 years this right was construed by federal courts as
merely granting an accused the right to be represented by counsel retained by him. Only
in capital offenses was a defendant deemed entitled to counsel when he was unable to
retain one. In 1938 the Supreme Court changed this construction by holding a court
would lose jurisdiction of a case by failing to provide counsel for an indigent who had not
waived this constitutional right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Three years
later the court expanded this view by imposing upon trial forums the duty of advising an
accused of his right to counsel where he appears without one. Walker v. Johnson, 312
U.S. 275 (1941); Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 44. This refinement of
the right to counsel came about therefore by way of decisional law and not by congressional
amendment. Ought this not to be the way in this matter of counsel for special courts-
martial? See also the dissenting opinion of Mr .Justice Frankfurter in Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137, 148 (1953).
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not matters with which the Service, as such, can bear responsibility.
These consequences simply represent the view that society itself attaches
to such a discharge. It would appear that service to country has always
been reckoned throughout our history as one of the noblest privileges and
duties of citizenship. As a result our society has been unwilling to grant
equal consideration to those citizens who do not choose to fulfill honorably
this privilege when called upon to do so. The legislation enacted by the
Congress over the years denying to such persons benefactions and privi-
leges is a harmonious example of this social attitude. Since the Congress
is the representative of our society at large, the legislation enacted by it
would appear to express more the will of this society that per se the indi-
vidual views of the members of Congress. The fact that some businesses
and labor unions may be unwilling to accept such persons for employment
or membership is another harmonious example of this social attitude at
work."6
Even though society is unwilling to grant equal consideration to
these persons, there is however no policy in the Navy which automatically
precludes the re-enlistment of individuals previously discharged from the
naval service with less than an honorable discharge. Currently, approxi-
mately 12 per cent of all applicants previously discharged with an ad-
verse discharge are being accepted for re-enlistment. Nor is there any
policy automatically precluding the re-enlistment of persons previously
discharged from another Service with less than an honorable discharge.
All that the Navy requires is that the applications for enlistment of such
persons, if deemed otherwise qualified by the recruiting officer, be referred
to the Chief of Naval Personnel for decision as to acceptability under the
same standards as apply to individuals in the same category with previous
naval service. There are any number of instances in the Navy of men
who have been tried by courts-martial as many as seven times in the
course of serving a full and useful career.
0 Even, in the early days of our military history when "marking" accompanied a
sentence to be dishonorably discharged or to be drummed out of the Service, an early
military writer tells us that this marking was not calculated to interfere with an individual's
adjustment to civilian life. He tells us that the object of the "marking" was solely to
prevent the fradulent reenlistment into the Service of a man once deemed unworthy to
remain in it. The regulations provided that the mark was never to be more than one inch
long, was to be placed on the hip or other equally concealed part of the body, and was
to be done with India ink or gunpowder, or some indelible composition. The latter were
considered well suited to the purpose since the marking with such ingredients, being common
among sailors and others, was generally understood by the public not to place a known
stigma of disgrace upon an individual. O'BRIEN, AMERICAN MILITARY LAW AND COURTS
MARTIAL 276 (1846).
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In the very nature of things it is immutable to a military organiza-
tion that there be punishment for the wicked, reward for the faithful and
honor for the brave. This is something which society knows-and ex-
pects! Under the circumstances it would make little difference by what
other name the military service would call a bad conduct charge. Once
society would come to know this other discharge as something less than
honorable, it would attach its own sense of importance to the discharge.
Moreover, the certificate of discharge which a man receives upon dis-
charge from the Service amounts to nothing more in the latter's opinion
than an honest accounting to society of the man's service to country. In
its opinion the certificate is, simply, the man's report card of that service.
The view therefore that society in modern times has attached to a bad
conduct discharge is one which has been independently arrived at by it to
the exclusion of the military service.
-8-
In May 1957 a study was initiated within the Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel to discover the probable proportions of naval personnel who con-
stitute the principal disciplinary problem, the range of patterns of military
behavior, disciplinary actions taken with respect to them, and whether
information could be found to differentiate the problem and nonproblem
groups.9" This study revealed the existence of a very definite relationship
between discipline in the Navy and juvenile delinquency. The study
showed that a great many of the individuals discharged from the Navy
with punitive discharges have generally followed the behavior pattern
of those in civilian life euphemistically referred to as juvenile delinquents.
Information reported in the public media" as well as that developed in
hearings before the Congress on the subject of juvenile delinquency98 all
tend to show that the latter is a problem everywhere present in our
society today. With the Universal Military Training and Service Act
requiring military service of every male of proper age, there is conse-
9
6 FORBES 0. BRYCE AND WILLIAM KAFFENBERGER, REPORT OF A STUDY OF
A 1000 MAN RANDOM SAMPLE OF NAVAL ENLISTED PERSONNEL, April 9, 1958
(Bureau of Naval Personnel).
97 Evening Star, February 10, 1958, p. A-12; Sunday Star, October 26, 1958, (Maga-
zine), p. 8; N. Y. Times, February 13, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
o8 Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1957-1958); S. REP. No. 130,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. REP No. 1429, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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quently little reason to indulge in any idealism that the Services are
unaffected by this problem.
Moreover, the most important influence upon a growing child is that
wielded by the adults whom he observes day after day. Certainly the be-
havior pattern displayed by his parents and the type of behavior which
his parents require of him are a primary influence in the character-forming
years of the child. In strong words, FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover has pointed
up parental responsibility in the current wave of juvenile delinquency and
mobsterism squarely at parents:
"We speak of church and of God's influence upon our people. But in how
many homes can the influence of religion truly be found? How many of
today's juvenile terrorists are products of unfortunate homes where parents
have neither the interest nor the desire to become an integral part of their
children's lives? Tragically, the moral decline which is evidenced in our
rapidly increasing rates of crime and delinquency can be traced to the very
portals of the home. Moral delinquency is so debauching, spiritual illiteracy is
so appalling and secularism is so blighting that unless God abides in the
intimate atmosphere of the family circle, the best efforts of the church and
other wholesome elements in the community may be inadequate to correct
the damage already done.
"The family is the first great training school in behavior or misbehavior.
Children develop a sense of right and wrong. The home becomes their first
classroom and the parents serve as the first teachers for the inspirational
education of youth. In the home the child learns that others besides himself
have rights which must oftentimes be respected. Here the spadework is laid
for instilling in the child those values which will cause him to develop into
an upright, law-abiding wholesome citizen. He must learn respect for others,
respect for property, courtesy, truthfulness, and reliability. He must learn
not only to manage his own affairs but also to share in the responsibility for
the affairs of the community. He must be taught to understand the necessity
of obeying the laws of God.
"These qualities, of course, are transmitted to the child only if they are
exemplified and taught within the family circle." 99
How often is it that a juvenile delinquent is encouraged by those
who have the primary responsibility for his behavior to enlist in the
military service on some secret notion that the Service will make a man
out of him?1.. And, how often is it that our criminal courts in civilian
life will give to a juvenile delinquent a choice of either going to jail or
enlisting in the Service?1"1 Obviously, few such persons come to the
99 Hoover, Juvenile Delinquency, 31 CONN. BAR J. 210 (1957).
100 Bishop, Planting Time Bomb of Delinquency, Evening Star, February 14, 1958,
p. A-23, col. 5. Civilians often ascribe to the military the magical power of endowing each
of its recruits with maturity and poise where none existed before. They sometimes en-
courage the youth to enlist with the fond hope that they will emerge from service as men.
Shackelford, The Youthful Oflender and the Armed Forces, 4 NATIONAL PROBATION AND
PAROLE ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 150 (1958).
101 Case records in the major military confinement facilities reveal numerous instances
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Service properly disposed to meet the assessment of citizenship required of
them under the Universal Military Training and Service Act. The essen-
tial mission of the military service is to prepare a body of men who are
at all times ready, willing and able to fight the public enemy. Order and
discipline are indispensible requisites to the fulfillment of this mission.
The Services do what they can to bring men along and to fit them into the
scheme of things, but it is simply not given to the Services to reform what
has so long been neglected by others.
Even a casual student of the history of education in our country must
acknowledge that we have been witnessing nothing less than a revolution
in our conception of the purpose of schools. This revolution in educa-
tional philosophy began with the Deweyean progressives about 1915 and
gained momentum in the 1920's. The system advanced by these pro-
gressives became known as progressive education. The early advocates
of this system believed that the aim in education was simply undefined
growth. Although the term "progressive education" is today largely a
term descriptive of a movement belonging to history, the system however
has left its mark on the philosophical side of education. The great cur-
rent educational controversy is in part over the mark left by this system.
For, the controversy is between those who believe the school should
primarily be an agency for the intellectual development of individuals
and those who believe it should primarily be an agency for social con-
ditioning.
There are some recent but interesting milestones along this revolu-
tionary road in the philosophy of education. In 1940 the American
Council on Education published a pamphlet entitled: "What the High
Schools Ought to Teach." This pamphlet deplored the emphasis on
mathematics and English in high school, describing them as "difficult"
subjects and as "stumbling blocks" that drive young people away from
high school. Foreign language study was belittled and it was remarked
that only "a few pupils need mathematical physics." Four years after the
publication of this pamphlet a report was issued by a commission of the
National Education Association, called Education for All American Youth.
This report said that "the job of the school is to meet the common and
specific needs of youth." Soon after this report was released by the com-
in which youthful offenders were encouraged, urged, or induced to join the services in lieu
of a sentence, continued probation or parole supervision, or further incarceration. Shackel-
ford, The Youthful Offender and the Armed Porces, 4 NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE
ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 148 (1958). See S. REP. No. 1429, 85th Congress, 2d Sess. 12-13
(1958) for statements of courts following this practice.
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mission a department of education in one of our states recommended that
the report be translated into an actual program. It suggested that high
schools should teach in addition to the traditional subjects the following:
Socio-economic problems, home care of the sick, driver education, safe
living, industrial hygiene, care of children, community health, home
decorating, consumer education, personal grooming, hospitality, housing,
boy and girl problems, and an understanding of reproduction.'
In 1948 came Higher Education for American Democracy, A Report
of the President's Commission on Higher Education. This said that "we
shall be denying educational opportunity to many young people as long
as we maintain the present orientation of higher education toward verbal
skills and intellectual interests." The highlight in these milestones was
reached in 1951 when the United States Office of Education brought forth
its famous bulletin called: Life Adjustment Education for Every Youth.
This bulletin reported that 60 per cent of American youth are incapable
of being prepared either for college or trained for skilled occupations;
that only a small minority of students can comprehend abstract mathe-
matics; that only a few have either the ability or the need to write and
speak with accuracy; and that educators may feel satisfied if they have
taught the majority enough reading to comprehend newspapers and
magazines "reasonably well." What is needed for this 60 per cent, or
the majority of American youth, said the report, is a program of "Life
Adjustment." According to the report this program was to bear little
resemblance to traditional programs in the fundamental skills and intel-
lectual disciplines, but was to make the school a sort of gigantic social
service agency aimed not at education but adjustment."8
The inability of American youth to meet the challenge of military
life today would seem directly related to this revolution in education
which has encouraged the public to accept in the schools a soft pedagogy
in every conceivable form. For, it has caused the public to forget what is
central in their tender regard for what is peripheral. The strong emphasis
on the desire to use the schools to promote physical and emotional sta-
bility, pleasant personalities and social adjustments has caused the public
to lose sight of the fact that the purpose of schools is to provide a program
containing those symbols and those facts which are essential to all later
learning. A program of such solid content provides the bright and average
students alike with some inner resources with which to counter mass
10 2 Mortimer Smith, Oar Schools Need More Than Mosey, TAX RYiBMW XIX: No.
2, February 1958, pp. 5-8.
103 Id.
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superstitions, customs and vulgarities. It aims to make the youth in time
literate in the various fields of organized human knowledge. This was
the idea of the function of the school which was uppermost in the minds
of the great pioneers of public education one hundred years ago. They
reasoned that a democracy is based on the idea that not only the elite but
also the ordinary, run-of-the-mill person is capable of intelligent judgment
in contributing to the whole, and that hence everyone has the same need
for acquiring the learning that is indispensable to the formation of that
judgment. This reasoning was not predicated upon any sophistry that all
people have the same inherent abilities or can benefit alike from the re-
finements of higher education. But this reasoning did assume that there
is a certain corpus of knowledge which is needed by everyone and which
can be transmitted to all except the definitely moronic.'"
That the reasoning of these great pioneers in education was essen-
tially based upon a sound philosophical concept is demonstrated by present
day experience in the Navy. The study generated within the Bureau of
Naval Personnel"' revealed the existence of a clear connection between
the education or noneducation of an individual and the ability of the in-
dividual to respond to military discipline. The study found that men with
a low GCT. ° and a good education0 7 have the lowest average for repeat-
ing military offenses, and that men with a similar GCT but poor edu-
cation have the highest average for repeating military offenses. The re-
port established the significance of this finding by observing that while
men with low GCT's may have only limited chances of achieving a petty
officer career because of high naval standards, they nonetheless are well
able to accommodate themselves to the demands of military life in in-
stances where a low GCT is accompanied with a good education. The
report also found that the bulk of the naval persons discharged from the
naval service with a bad conduct discharge is largely composed of persons
with poor education, and that, in the main, it would appear to make
little difference whether these persons have a high or low GCT if they
have not had good education. Similarly, other findings of the report sup-
port the premise that the disciplines of a good education are essential to
the formulation of judgments upon which successful military service is
104 Id.
105 Bryce, Op. cit. supra note 97.
106 General Classification Test. This test is essentially a measure of learning ability,
scaled from 21 to 78 in the normal range, with a normal median at 50, which equates to
an Intelligent Quotient of approximately 100. Low GTC, 41 and under.
107 Eleventh grade and above.
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based. Without such an education individuals are simply ill-prepared to
assume this responsibiliyt of citizenship. s
The military services are large consumers of the product of our edu-
cational institutions. Unfortunately, this product does not measure up
to what is required by the Services today. 9
-9-
The primary purpose in proposing revision of the Code to provide
for single-officer special courts-martial in the person of a law officer is a
desire to improve the efficiency of the administration of military justice.
As a result of suggestions made from time to time by the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals the Services have been striving to grant law officers more
of the power possessed by civilian judges and to adopt from the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure those rules which would provide beneficial
disposition of military cases. Since the proposal is one of prime interest
to the Services at this time-and is also one about which Professor Keeffe
has misgiving 1 1-- it invites discussion.
The Code confers on the President power to prescribe rules of pro-
cedure, including modes of proof, which shall "as far as he deems practica-
ble, apply the principles of law and the rule of evidence generally recog-
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States District Courts"
that are not inconsistent with or contrary to the Code. 1 ' By passing this
provision the Congress indicated its desire that the conduct of courts-
martial shall be in accordance with the rules generally recognized in the
108 A recent press release stated that the Army in two-and-a half years has demobilized
70,000 men and is expected to demobilize an additional 25,000 in the near future. The re-
lease stated that "new personnel policies-including a ruthless weeding-out of substandard
soldiers unofficially termed 'Operation Meathead'-is largely responsible for the change."
Evening Star, January 7, 1959, p. A-7, col. 7.
109 E.g., if the emphasis in our schools is on "Life Adjustment," then it would seem
that the schools would by now have some courses on how to get along in the Service and
on the consequences that follow in not getting along. One of the announced purposes of
schools is to prepare students for citizenship. Military service is a requirement of citizenship.
On this educational point, in general, see RICKOVER, EDUCATION AND FREEDOM
(1959).
110 Keeffe, Op. cit. supra note 89, at 8.
The bill, H.R. 3387, containing this proposal, was introduced by Representative
Vinson (Georgia), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, on January 26,
1959 for consideration by the present Congress. The bill has the approval of the judges of
the Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates General of the armed forces. The
Navy nurtures real hope that this proposal for establishing single-officer special courts-
martial will in time find such solid acceptance on the part of the Congress and legal fra-
ternity at large as to merit in their judgment a broader use of it than is now stated in the bill.
111 UCMJ, Art. 36.
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trial of criminal cases in the federal courts. In this regard Rule 23(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures provides-
"Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant
waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent
of the Government."
This provision for waiver of jury trial by the defendant was formal-
ized by the federal courts in March 1946 and embodied the existing prac-
tice that had grown up through the years. This rule, or a similar rule,
has long been followed in most states. In many states by express pro-
vision the constitution and statutes permit waiver of jury trial in criminal
cases. In other states statutory provision is made for trial without jury
unless demanded by the defendant, or practice otherwise allows for waiver
of jury trial in particular situations. The fact that the federal and state
courts have long followed the practice is some indication that it has a
good basis in law, and that the weight of juristic thinking is on the side
of the rule. In fact, the constitutionality of Rule 23 (a).. 2 has been upheld
many times.
The infusion of many principles of civilian law into the military law
by the Code has created situations which were not formerly presented to
court-martial authorities. Formerly, in order to be fairly proficient, one in
the Navy had only to be familiar with the provisions of its manual en-
titled Naval Courts and Boards and the Articles for the Government of the
Navy. Now, however, the Court of Military Appeals is day by day cre-
ating a body of case law which is as important as the Code itself to one
engaged in military justice work. It is true that some case law existed
in the Navy even before the advent of the Code, but this law was rela-
tively unimportant in that it was largely composed of ad hoc decisions.
Under the Code the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals exercise a
far greater influence than did the decisions of former days. Hence, one
engaged in military justice work today is no longer able to rely strictly
upon the provisions of a manual and the Code, but needs to have training
in the principles of procedural and substantive military justice law as
contained in cases decided by the Court of Military Appeals.11
The impact of the decision in United States v. Clay,"' for instance,
112 Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
(1942).
1Is Barnard, The Uniform Code of Military Justice-A Recommendation, 26 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 49, 50 (1953).
1141 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951).
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has made the position of the president of a special court-martial difficult in
instances when he is called on to instruct the other members of the court
on the elements of the offense charged, presumption of innocence, rule of
reasonable doubt and burden of proof. Experience has indicated that
often-times it is a case of the blind leading the blind. The various
aids for court-martial attempt to fill this void by providing a short synopsis
generally of a half dozen lines. While this ready-made, capsule-type
instruction may be sufficient in cases involving simple issues, such pre-
fabricated instructions are obviously wholly inadequate in cases involving
unusual facts since they ignore particular problems presented by the evi-
dence. In unanimously overturning the conviction in the Clay case for
failure of the president to instruct in these areas, the Court stated that
"the accused was denied those necessary elements of military due process
by which Congress sought to protect him.""'  The establishment of law
officer special courts-martial would do much to guarantee to accused
persons rights and safeguards "parallel" to those granted to civilians and
observed by civilian courts.
Unlike in the case of general courts-martial, there is no requirement
that the records of special courts-martial not involving a sentence to bad
conduct discharge must be referred to a staff legal officer for opinion in
advance of action by the convening authority. In former days the preroga-
tive of the convening authority to determine what portion of a sentence
adjudged is correct in law and fact without prior legal advice stemmed
from the concept that the entire machinery for review was set up merely
to furnish trustworthy information to the officer to whom there had been
delegated the disciplinary function. This concept was based upon military
history and more particularly upon a decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Dynes v. Hoover"8 to the effect that
courts-martial are established not under the Judiciary Article III of the
Constitution, but under Article II which makes the President commander-
in-chief and Article I which gives Congress power to make rules for the
government of the land and naval forces."" However, the Congress in
enacting the Code shifted the emphasis from this concept to the one pro-
nounced by the Supreme Court some 30 years later in the case of
Runkle v. United States.1 8 There the Court said:
115 Id., at 82.
11620 How. 25 (1857).
217 Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV.
169, 170 (1953).
11s 122 U.S. 543 (1887).
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"The whole proceedings from its inception is judicial. The trial, findings
and sentence are the solemn act of a court organized and conducted under
the authority of and according to the prescribed forms of law. It sits to pass
upon the most sacred questions of human rights that are ever placed on trial in
a court of justice; rights which, in the very nature of things, can neither
be exposed to danger nor subjected to the uncontrolled will of any man,
but which must be adjudged according to law."
A record of trial, therefore, coming up for action by the convening au-
thority, which reflects what has transpired in a case tried before a law
officer, would furnish to him, by indirection at least, some measure of legal
opinion regarding the findings and sentence adjudged in the case.
Under the Code the court-martial system is more and more being
examined not only for its military effectiveness but for its basic justice
as measured by American ideals. In this connection there have from
time to time been indications in the public media that the reports of
proceedings in special courts-martial often leave much to be desired. These
indications would appear to constitute one of the more important reasons
for establishing law officer special courts-martial. For experienced law-
yers know that after the excitement of a trial is over the record of pro-
ceedings is all that remains behind in a case to protect the rights of an
accused to such further due process to which he might be entitled under
the law. It has always been that those who do not in their daily pursuit
brush intimately with the practice of law are unable to grasp fully the
significance of a lawyer's jealous regard for the record. Yet so much so is
this regard that, whenever need be in civilian practice, opposing counsel
will engage their own court reporters in order to safeguard and protect the
record from error and chicanery. Knowing this, no law officer, true to his
oath as a lawyer, would presume to affix his signature to a record which
did not fully report the trial conducted before him.
As already mentioned, the records of courts-martial in the Navy
reveal that approximately 90 per cent of the special court-martial cases
in which the sentence involves a bad conduct discharge are based upon
guilty pleas. 9 The Navy believes that in the vast majority of cases an
accused desiring to plead guilty would probably elect to be tried by a
law officer court. With the system of prearranged pleas (borrowed from
civilian practice) now being followed in the Navy, this probability would
even grow. The accused would be insured the opportunity to be tried by
an officer of mature judgment in matters of law. The latter, being a
trained and capable lawyer, would be in a better position to weigh and
119 See note 93, sura.
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analyze impartially the evidence of mitigation and extenuation or of ag-
gravation that follows conviction, and to know from his experience in
legal affairs what would be an appropriate sentence for the offense that
has been proved against the accused persons. Certainly law officers are
better qualified to fix and adjudge sentences than are members of courts
who have neither training nor any minimum experience in military
justice when they sit as court members.
During World War II Canada adopted a provision for a single-
officer court-martial when an Order-in-Council created a court entitled a
"Standing Court-Martial" to try enlisted personnel.' As a result of this
Order-in-Council 25 officers were appointed to sit as a one-man court,
with the powers of a general court-martial. The officers appointed were
qualified lawyers or judge advocates serving in the Canadian army. The
individual members, traveling from place to place as needed, tried some
12,500 cases during the period May 1944 to September 1946. Only a
very small percentage of the persons convicted by these courts submitted
petitions for redress. Under these courts the commander of the accused's
unit had only a limited power to review, but anent to this he had also the
discretion to order a case tried instead by a normally constituted court-
martial.' In view of the practical advantages and favorable experience
with this form of tribunal the Canadian Government caused to be enacted
following World War II permanent legislation providing that the
Governor-in-Council may, in an emergency, establish one-officer standing
courts-martial to try any person in the military service charged with com-
mitting a service offense.' The success of the system in Canada would
seem to furnish some real evidence of the desirability of this system under
the Code.
An examination of the pertinent items of legislative history indicates
that there existed at the time the Code was enacted into law a deep
seated conviction on the part of Congress and other sponsors of the Code
that law officers should perform in the image of a civilian judge. By and
large, the law officers have satisfied this great expectation. For under
the present system, regardless of statements to the contrary, the experience
has been that a law officer is subject to little, if any, control by higher
120ORDER-IN-COUNCIL P.C. 3375, May 5, 1944.
121 Letter From W. M. W. Shaw, Deputy Judge Advocate General of Canada, to Conrad
W. Freed, Chief of Plans and Policy Division, USAF Central Coordinating Staff, February 25,
1955, on file in Army Library.
1
2 2 
THE QUEEN'S REGULATIONS AND ORDERS FOR THE CANADIAN ARMY, Vol. II,
Art. 113.51 (1952).
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authority, other than decisions of boards of review and the Court of
Military Appeals. Law officers know that evidence of deference in the
trial record, or even outside of the record, adversely affecting the rights
of an accused would bring quick action on the part of the boards of review
and the Court of Military Appeals. They have come to know only too
well that their rulings and decisions are subject to review by these ap-
pellate bodies, and that any deference of the kind mentioned would bring
them naught.
Moreover, the military lawyer, when he dons uniform, nevertheless
remains a lawyer subject to his professional code of ethics. His interest
in military justice is by its nature an interest in a field of law. By virtue
of his status in the military service, his time is spent more in the field of
the administration of military law than with military discipline, and is
concerned with its improvement. Since this is his interest he is almost
certainly less well informed within the sphere of military discipline under
ordinary circumstances than court members as a whole. Being aware
that evil command influence is improper, there is every reason to believe
that a military lawyer when sitting as a one-man special court-martial will
adopt every course within his capability to eradicate it. Furthermore, the
independent position of the law officer in the present day scheme of mili-
tary justice is now known and generally understood. This knowledge and
understanding should augur well for the success of this proposal. Surely,
the experience factor with the law officer concept to date ought to be
strongly persuasive evidence in this respect."
-10-
There is no principle more thoroughly incorporated in our military,
as well as in our civil law, then that the citizen on becoming a soldier
does not merge his former character in the latter. On becoming a soldier
the citizen does not release himself from any of his former duties or
obligations. Instead, he engages to perform other duties in addition to
those with which he was formerly charged. He submits himself to a
special code of laws which does not supersede or abrogate that to which
he was formerly subject. On the contrary this special code binds him by
123 Recently 30 selected Army, Navy and Marine officers began a three-week intensive
law officer course at the Judge Advocate General's School at the University of Virginia prior
to assignment. Evening Star, February 20, 1959, p. A-26, col. 5. This press release indicates
in an affirmative manner the way in which law officers are being educated and re-educated
by the Services in order to insure a high standard of performance by them.
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a new tie to the very same authority which he previously obeyed as a
citizen. He stands in precisely the same position he formerly occupied
with regard to the civil powers and authorities. He cannot throw off the
obligations and responsibilities which the civil powers and authorities
impress upon him inasmuch as he does not cease to be a citizen.12"
The military law aims solely to enforce on the soldier the additional
duties he has assumed. For the military code begins where the civil code
ends. The military law finds a body of men, who besides being citizens,
are also soldiers. It finds that their rights and duties as citizens are already
well settled and established, but that their rights and duties as soldiers are
undefined and unascertained. The military law aims to fill this vacuum left
by the civil code in order to place the soldier as completely under cover
of law and to guard him as securely against tyrannical and arbitrary power
in his military character, as in his civil character. The foundation of the
miltary system of discipline is, therefore, the same as the foundation of
our civilian system of discipline-
The preservation of the dignity of the individual.'
124 In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
1
2 J. Lawton Collins, Understanding Our Nation's Global Role, ARMY INFORMATION
DIGEST, May 1952, p. 7.
